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Chile Under Allende: The Decline Of The
Judiciary And The Rise Of
A State Of Necessity
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 1973, the government of President Salvador
Allende of Chile was overthrown by a four-member military junta.'
The overthrow came in the form of violent coup d'etat in which Presi-
dent Allende was killed.2 "The demise of the brief Allende experi-
ment in 1970-73 came as the cumulative result of many factors -
external and internal. The academic debate as to whether the external
or the internal factors weighed more heavily is endless."
'3
It is quite clear that in the early 1970's the United States had
adopted a foreign policy using diplomatic, covert and economic pres-
sure against Chile.4 This policy was the response by the United States
to the Allende regime.5
Although this is true, the overthrow of Salvador Allende's gov-
ernment cannot be attributed solely to external factors, nor can one
factor or event explain what occurred. This Comment will concen-
trate on a few of the internal factors which led to the overthrow of
Salvador Allende by the military junta in 1973. In his 1973 testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational
Corporations, Charles Meyer, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs (during the Nixon Administration), stated that
"[tihe policy of the United States was that Chile's problem was a
Chilean problem, to be settled by Chile."' 6 This Comment will at-
tempt to show that during the Allende rule in Chile the existence of a
1. L.A. Times, Jan. 16, 1987, § 1, at 12, col. 1.
2. Id.
3. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, 94TH CONG., IST SESS., COVERT ACTION IN CHILE 1963-73
32 (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter COVERT ACTION IN CHILE].
4. Id. at 32.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 26-27 (quoting Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 402 (1973) (testimony of Charles Meyer, Assistant Sec. of State
for Inter-American Affairs)).
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"Chilean problem" was a significant factor leading to the overthrow
of Allende. Furthermore, this Comment will demonstrate that the
"Chilean problem" was initiated and created by the Allende govern-
ment and eventually settled by the public unrest in Chile which re-
sulted in the coup d'etat by the military junta.
This article intends to explain the coup d'etat from an internal
perspective, and also to solve the enigmatic occurrence of a coup
d'etat in such a firmly rooted democratic country as Chile.7 Some
comparisons with the United States Constitution and certain ideas of
its Framers will be used to develop an understanding of what oc-
curred in Chile under Allende. In addition, the jurisprudential
maxim saluspopuli suprema lex (the law of necessity) will also be used
to explain the overthrow of Allende. It should be noted, however,
that this Comment is not intended to excuse the atrocities that oc-
curred during the coup d'etat or those that have occurred
subsequently.8
There are three pertinent historical facts which make the over-
throw of Salvador Allende in Chile a very unique event. First, Chile
"is the only country in the world that freely and democratically
elected a Marxist President . . . ." Second, that President was re-
moved from office prior to the expiration of his constitutional term in
a violent, unconstitutional manner.10 Thirdly, this unconsitutional
overthrow (coup d'etat) "occurred in a country with the longest and
best established democratic tradition in all of Latin America."'" To
understand the overthrow, some understanding of the history of Chile
is required.
II. HISTORY
A. Constitutional History
Chile's constitutional and, in turn, judicial life, began with the
7. Velasco, The Allende Regime in Chile: An Historical and Legal Analysis (pt. 1), 9
Loy. L.A.L. REV. 480 (1976).
8. COVERT ACTION IN CHILE, supra note 3, at 62; see also S. CHAVKIN, THE MURDER
OF CHILE 9-10 (1982); CHILE: A COUNTRY STUDY 42-43 (Merrill 2d ed. 1982).
9. Velasco, supra note 7, at 480.
10. Id. at 480-8 1. For a good discussion of the constitutionality of a coup d'etat see Has-
san, A Juridical Critique of Successful Treason: A Jurisprudential Analysis of the Constitutional.
ity of Coup d'Etat in the Common Law, 20 STAN. J. INT'L L. 191 (1984).
11. Velasco, supra note 7, at 481.
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Constitution of 1833.12 The Constitution of 1833 lasted until Septem-
ber 18, 1925, when a new Constitution was approved in a national
plebescite. 13 The new Constitution reestablished "a clear presidential
regime with a strong executive power, in which the ministers were of
the President's exclusive confidence and freely appointed by him." 14
Congress maintained its power to impeach ministers and the Presi-
dent for certain defined infringements on the Constitution.15 The sep-
aration between Church and State, as well as complete freedom of
conscience and worship, were created. 16 Individual rights were en-
larged and improved.1
7
The Constitution further set up an independent judiciary with
the attributes of a third state power. 18 It established a Congress
which consisted of two houses: "a Senate with forty-five members,
representing nine senatorial districts, and a House of Representatives,
whose members represented congressional districts in proportion to
population.' 19
All elections in Chile were to be direct with the presidential can-
didate needing an absolute majority (one-half of the votes plus one)
for victory. 20 In the event that none of the candidates obtained a ma-
jority, Congress was required to choose the President from between
the two candidates who had received the highest number of votes. 21
In addition, the Constitution established an autonomous election tri-
12. Id. For a copy of the Constitution of 1833, see L. VALENCIA AVARIA, ANALES DE
LA REPUBLICA 160 (1951).
13. Velasco, supra note 7, at 485. For a copy of the Constitution of 1925, see PROYECTOS
DE REFORMA DE LA CONSTITUCI6N POLfTICA DE LA REPO6BLICA DE CHILE (1925) [herein-
after PROYECTOS].
14. Velasco, supra note 7, at 485; see CHILE CONST. OF 1925 arts. 60 & 72, reprinted in
PROYECTOS, supra note 13, at 23, 26.
15. Velasco, supra note 7, at 485; see CHILE CONST. OF 1925 art. 39, reprinted in
PROYECTOS, supra note 13, at 15.
16. Velasco, supra note 7, at 485; see CHILE CONST. OF 1925 art. 10, § 2, reprinted in
PROYECTOS, supra note 13, at 7.
17. Velasco, supra note 7, at 485; see, e.g., CHILE CONST. OF 1925 art. 10, reprinted in
PROYECTOS, supra note 13, at 7.
18. Velasco, supra note 7, at 485; see CHILE CONST. OF 1925 art. 80, reprinted in
PROYECTOS, supra note 13, at 29. Article 80 states: "The power of judging civil and criminal
causes belongs exclusively to the established courts of law [the Judiciary]. Neither the Presi-
dent of the Republic, nor Congress, shall, in any case exercise judicial functions .... "
19. Velasco, supra note 7, at 485; see CHILE CONST. OF 1925 arts. 24-25, reprinted in
PROYECTOS, supra note 13, at 12.
20. Velasco, supra note 7, at 485; see CHILE CONST. OF 1925 art. 63, reprinted in
PROYECTOS, supra note 13, at 24.
21. Velasco, supra note 7, at 485; see CHILE CONST. OF 1925 art. 64, reprinted in
PROYECTOS, supra note 13, at 24.
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bunal in order to supervise presidential and congressional elections as
well as to resolve any problems that might arise in connection with
them.
22
Many similarities existed between the structure of the govern-
ment of Chile under Allende and that of the United States.23 Both
governments were established as constitutional democracies. Compa-
rable to the United States, in Chile there existed three, almost four,
branches of government which acted as a set of checks and balances
upon one another. These branches were the Executive (the Presi-
dent), the Judicial (the Judiciary), and the Legislative (the Congress,
which consisted of a senate [Senado] and a house of representatives
[Camara de Diputados]). A "quasi" fourth branch of government
also existed in Chile. This was a public institution called the Con-
traloria General of the Republic. 24 It was completely autonomous
and its essential duties were to exercise preventive control over the
legality of executive acts and to supervise and approve expenditures of
public funds in accordance with the law. 25 It should be noted that
Chilean law provided a solution for certain serious disagreements be-
22. Velasco, supra note 7, at 485; see CHILE CONST. OF 1925 art. 79, reprinted in
PROYECTOS, supra note 13, at 29.
23. The government of the United States consists of a three branch system very similar to
that established by the Constitution of Chile. Comparable to the Chilean Constitution, the
U.S. Constitution established a strong executive power vested in a President of the United
States who is also Commander in Chief of the armed forces. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 21.
The legislative branch of the U.S. Government consists of a Senate and House of Representa-
tives (House numbers represent congressional districts created in proportion to population)
which possess the power to make laws. The Senate has the sole power to try all impeachments.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, § 3, cl. 6 and § 8, cl. 18. The U.S. Government also consists
of a judicial branch (power) which is created by article III of the U.S. Constitution. Compare
with Chilean Constitution of 1925, supra notes 14, 15, 18, 19.
24. Velasco, The Allende Regime in Chile: An Historical and Legal Analysis (pt. 2), 9
Loy. L.A.L. REv. 711, 723 (1976).
25. Id. Velasco states:
In order to carry out its first duty, every decree dictated by the President, and all
administrative resolutions of the public agencies had to be sent to the Contraloria for
its analysis and approval prior to being officially promulgated. In the event the Con-
traloria considered the decrees of resolutions illegal, it rejected and remanded them,
thereby rendering them unenforceable.
Id. However, it should be noted that
there were exceptions to this general principle, one of which was that in extraordi-
nary cases where there was an evident urgency for the enforcement of the decree, the
Contraloria could permit the immediate execution prior to its approval. It was
clearly understood, however, that the decree would become void if the Contraloria
later rejected it.
Id. The executive branch had the largest amount of power of all the branches of government
and hence the Contraloria acted as a "checks and balance" institution on the executive. Id.
Also note that it has been suggested that the President of the United States has similar emer-
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tween the Contraloria and the Executive with respect to the legality of
a supreme executive decree which the Executive considered as the so-
lution to an urgent problem.26 Apparently, if the Contraloria dis-
agreed with the Executive about the legal interpretation of a proposed
decree, the interpretation of the executive was to prevail only in ex-
treme situations. 27 In order for the Executive interpretation to pre-
vail, a new decree was to be issued and signed this time by the
President and all his ministers, thus constituting a virtual insistence
that the Contraloria approve the decree and permit its enforcement.28
This type of decree was known as a "Decree of Insistence" and "its
sole objective was to provide a solution in certain cases of conflict of
interpretation. ' ' 29 One can see the potential for abuse in the use of
this decree when an independently minded executive wishes to unilat-
erally institute his policies and ideologies. This is, in fact, what oc-
curred under Allende and will be discussed later in this article.
B. History of the Allende Government
In the Chilean presidential election of 1970, Allende obtained
36.3 percent of the votes. 30 His two main opponents obtained the fol-
lowing percentages: Allesandri 34.9 percent, and Tomic 27.8 per-
cent. 31 Since a clear majority was not achieved by any candidate
(one-half of the votes plus one) the Congress was left with the task of
electing the new president. It followed the candidate with the largest
popular vote and elected Allende as president. 32
"Allende's platform consisted of the Popular Unity (UP) pro-
gram." 33 The UP program was aimed at the construction of an "area
of social property. '3 4 This area consisted of "(1) companies that al-
gency powers to legislate on a short term basis. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952); War Powers Resolution of 1973, § 2(c), 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
26. Velasco, supra note 24, at 723-24.
27. Id. at 724.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. CHILE AND ALLENDE 31 (L. Sobel ed. 1974).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 31, 35. It should be noted that the Christian Democrats, who were the strong-
est party in Chile, voted for Allende on one condition. That condition was that a constitu-
tional amendment, designed to prevent the Marxist minority from taking advantage of its
power to end the democratic and free regime that existed in Chile, be approved, and it was.
CHILE AND ALLENDE, supra note 30, at 32.
33. Velasco, supra note 24, at 724.
34. Id.; see also D. CUSACK, REVOLUTION AND REACTION: THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS
OF CONFLICT AND CONFRONTATION IN CHILE 33 (1977).
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ready belonged to the state... [and] (2) certain privately owned com-
panies which were to be legally expropriated, including foreign owned
companies which exploited the basic wealth of the country.1
3 5
The expropriation of property was instituted on a large scale.
3 6
"Allende had been advised by one of his advisors, a professor of law,
that it was possible to transform socio-economic structures in Chile
without enacting new laws, just by taking advantage of existing legal
rules."' 37 One of these existing laws came about from the Socialist
Republic of 1932 and allowed for the requisition of products or basic
goods in a temporary or transitory form when abnormalities in the
production process made it necessary for the public interests. 38 This
law was eventually abused by the Allende government. On hundreds
of occasions, the Allende government requisitioned not only the prod-
ucts, but the producing companies themselves. 39 Furthermore, these
requisitions were done on a permanent basis rather than for only
short, transitory periods as required by law.40 This allowed the gov-
ernment to effectively, although not legally, transfer the companies
into the "area of social property.
'41
This same legislation allowed the government to intervene in the
management of a company when a labor conflict paralyzed it.42 All
that was required of the government was that it appoint an " 'inter-
venor' whose task was to manage the enterprise temporarily while he
looked for the quickest possible solution to the labor conflict." 43 The
intervention was deemed to end when the conflict was resolved. 44 On
many occasions these conflicts were never resolved and the UP gov-
35. Velasco, supra note 24, at 711.
36. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
37. Velasco, supra note 24, at 714.
38. Id.; see also CHILE AND ALLENDE, supra note 30, at 44 (where Economy Minister
Pedro Vuskovic was accused of being involved in illegal government takeovers and requisitions
of private textile plants). See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
39. Velasco, supra note 24, at 714. The Allende government "requisitioned" the Ford
Motor Company plant, ITT, RCA Victor Electronic Enterprises, as well as 150 Chilean firms
it deemed as key to the economy. CHILE AND ALLENDE, supra note 30, at 56-57. It also
nationalized the copper industry. Id. at 52. Further examples of manufacturing and industrial
plants which were requisitioned are Pizarpefio, Aga Chile, Cumming Diesel, Toro Glassware,
Artela Schiaffino, Marisio, Cerillos Copper, and Lucchetti and Lanex. El Mercurio, July 3,
1973, at 1, col. 4.
40. Velasco, supra note 24, at 714.
41. Id.; see infra note 45 and accompanying text.
42. Velasco, supra note 24, at 714.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 714-15.
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ernment maintained control of the companies. 45 The UP government
was, therefore, able to accomplish a transfer of factories into the so-
cial area.46 As stated earlier, many of these interventions and expro-
priations were arbitrary and illegal.
47
Protests to these expropriations came from the public sector as
well as from Congress. 48 The Allende regime used the "Decree of
Insistence" to override any objections to the expropriations that were
taking place. When an expropriation or "government requisition"
took place, the Allende government would issue a "requisition" or
"intervention" decree and send it to the Contraloria. 49 When "the
Contraloria rejected one of these decrees as being illegal, which oc-
curred with increasing frequency, the President and his ministers is-
45. Id. at 715. The takeovers of Cervecerilis Unidas and Insa Automobile Tire Co. "re-
portedly followed a pattern of worker seizures followed by State intervention through ap-
pointed ministers." CHILE AND ALLENDE, supra note 30, at 57. Furthermore, this pattern
"had been used extensively by the government of President Salvador Allende to extend public
ownership to important plants." Id. It was also noted that the Allende government artificially
created labor conflicts itself in order to requisition and expropriate these plants. An example
of this occurred in the takeover of the Mademsa Company plant which resulted in the Con-
traloria overtly condemning this type of action by the executive as illegal. El Mercurio, May 8,
1973, at 19, cols. 6-7.
46. Velasco, supra note 24, at 715; see also supra note 44.
47. See supra notes 38 & 45 and accompanying text. Furthermore, there were "legal"
expropriations resulting from these legislative loopholes, yet the MIR (Movimiento de Iz-
quierda Revolucionaria) under Jacques Chonchol, Allende's Minister of Agriculture, were en-
gaging in illicit tomas (seizures of land). With the silent concurrence of Chonchol, the MIR
simply "booted people out of their houses and off their farms, killing those who resisted."
These people were not all great landowners or absentee landlords but were people who lived
and worked on their property, having everything they owned tied up in their land, machinery,
stock, and buildings. Buckley, Death of a Republic: An Impression, NAT'L REV., Aug. 1,
1975, at 831. Velasco states:
From a legal point of view it is evident from these cases of intervention that there
existed not only the abuses and arbitrariness described above, but also a serious viola-
tion of the law by the government because of its passive attitude and because of its
failure to fulfill its constitutional duty to maintain public order and to respect the
rights of citizens.
Velasco, supra note 24, at 715. The constitutional duty of the President to maintain the public
order and respect the rights of citizens is stated in article 71 of the Constitution of 1925 and
incorporated by reference. PROYECTOS, supra note 11, at 26.
48. Large anti-Allende demonstrations were held and strikes were instituted as a protest
to the Allende government. See CHILE AND ALLENDE, supra note 30, at 49; CHILE: A COUN-
TRY STUDY, supra note 8, at 244-45, 246-47. The Chilean Congress accused Allende of illegal
and unconstitutional acts. El Mercurio, Aug. 24, 1973, at 1, col. 1. The Chamber of Deputies
(analogous to the U.S. House of Representatives) declared the government illegal in a special
session. They also voted to "censure Allende's government and appealed to the armed forces
to 'reestablish the Constitution and the law.' " See El Mercurio, Aug. 22, 1973, at 1, col. 5; see
also CHILE: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 8, at 248.
49. Velasco, supra note 24, at 724.
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sued a Decree of Insistence forcing the Contraloria to approve it."50
"This became a more or less habitual form of administering the coun-
try. It was evident that this procedure, marginally legal at best, was
being abused, since it is inconceivable that this exceptional legal insti-
tution was intended to permit the executive systematically to violate
the law."''
C. Breakdown of the Judiciary (Judicial Branch)
"The Constitution of 1925 categorically established the judiciary
as a state power and, therefore, autonomous, independent, and
supreme with respect to the administration of justice. ' ' 52 According
to the Constitution, the executive branch of government was required
to "provide the public force necessary to execute the decisions of the
judiciary without inquiring into the substance of the decisions nor
whether they are just or not."
'5 3
It is worth noting here that in any constitutional democracy such
as that of Chile under Allende or the United States, the judicial
branch of government is the weakest.5 4 This is because the judiciary,
unlike the executive and legislative branches of government, has no
power to compel compliance with its orders or decisions but relies
solely on the executive for enforcement or compliance.
In many of the cases dealing with the expropriations of property
by the Allende government, "the people affected turned successfully
to the courts."' 55 Judges ordered many peasants and workers to re-
turn illegally occupied land as well as to evacuate illegally seized fac-
50. Id.
51. Velasco, supra note 24, at 724.
52. Id. at 725.
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. This is because, in Chile, as in the United States, the Executive's power is manifested
by the fact that he is Commander in Chief of the armed forces. The Legislative power is
exhibited by its power of law making and of impeachment. See text accompanying note 15; see
also note 23 and accompanying text. The Judiciary (in both countries) relies on the executive
to carry out its judgments. From the judiciary's dependence on the executive for enforcement
of its judgments comes its weakness. As stated by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist
Papers:
The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over the sword or the purse; no
direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active
resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but
merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm for
the efficacy of its judgments.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
55. Velasco, supra note 24, at 725.
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tories.56 These judgments and orders of the courts became worthless
because "almost invariably the Interior Ministry [which was the ad-
ministrative department in charge of enforcing judicial decrees] re-
fused to authorize police forces to carry out the orders." 57 The judges
and the affected parties brought these facts to the attention of the
Supreme Court which in turn pointed out the illegality of the execu-
tive's inaction to the President, but to no avail.5 8
As one might imagine, a heated controversy and ultimately a
struggle for the independence and autonomy of the judicial system
arose between the judiciary and the executive branch of the Chilean
government. In October of 1972, the Supreme Court sent an official
letter to Allende informing him of "the absolute necessity of in-
structing his cabinet to instruct in turn their subordinates to adhere
strictly to the decisions that, in the exercise of their constitutional
attributions, emanate from the ordinary courts of justice."5 9 Further-
more, "[i]n this letter the Supreme Court also called on the President
to instruct his subordinates to show the judiciary the courtesy which
it deserved." 6 What followed was that the:
Intendente of Santiago declared to the press that he would not pro-
vide the public force for the return of any of the intervened compa-
nies pursuant to the judgments, because this "could cause serious
incidents and public disturbances." . . . [Tihe Minister of the Inte-
rior sent a "confidential memo" to all the Intendentes and gover-
nors ordering them not to exercise the public force [necessary] to
carry out any judgment unless the Minister himself considered it
convenient.
61
The controversy became so heated that in May of 1973 the
Supreme Court sent an official and emphatic letter to the President
"directly mentioning 'the breakdown of the legal order of the coun-
try.' ",62 In the letter the Court stated:
This Court must protest to you, as it has done numerable times in
the past, about the illegal acts of the administrative authorities who
are illicitly interfering with the proper exercise of the judicial
56. N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1973, at 12, col. 4.
57. Id.
58. Velasco, supra note 24, at 725.
59. Reprinted in El Mercurio, Oct. 31, 1972, at 9, col. 7, as translated by Velaseo, supra
note 24, at 725-26.
60. Velasco, supra note 24, at 726.
61. Id.
62. Id.; see supra note 48 and accompanying text (where the Chamber of Deputies voted
to censure the Allende government due to the disregard for the Constitution and the law).
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power, and who are preventing the police force from carrying out
criminal sentences duly emanating from the criminal courts, when,
according to the laws, these sentences should be carried out by said
force without any obstacles. These acts signify a decided obstinacy
in rebelling against the judicial sentences and a total lack of con-
cern about the alteration that these attitudes and omissions have
produced in the juridical order. All of this no longer means a sim-
ple crisis of state under the rule of Law, as was manifested to you
in our previous letter, but a peremptory or imminent rupture of the
country's legality.
63
This time Allende responded with a long, harsh letter theorizing
that with respect to the execution of judicial sentences, "the govern-
ment, as 'warrantor of peace and public order,' should analyze each
case and make its own judgments on the merits as to whether or not it
would grant the assistance of the public force to carry them out."
64
Under the Constitution of Chile this was not within the powers of the
Executive branch, and hence was unconstitutional. 65 In fact, by the
arbitrary and reluctant attitude of enforcing the judicial judgments,
the President had ironically disturbed the peace and public order. He
had become the agitator of peace and public order rather than the
"warrantor," and had thus violated his constitutional duty.66
The Supreme Court in another letter replied:
The President has undertaken the task, specially difficult and pain-
ful for him since he only knows the Law through hearsay, of deter-
mining for this Supreme Court the rules for the interpretation of
the Law, a duty which in the matters entrusted to it, belongs exclu-
sively to the judiciary and not to the executive.
67
What resulted was the definite breakdown of the respect and
comity between the executive and the judiciary as well as the indepen-
dence and autonomy of the judicial system. 68 The judiciary had lost
its autonomy and because of the Executive's (Allende's) inaction, it
had in essence become a worthless entity. This was July of 1973 and
63. Velasco, supra note 24, at 726 (quoting letter to President Allende from Chilean
Supreme Court dated May 1973).
64. Id. (quoting President Allende's letter in response to Chilean Supreme Court's letter
dated May 1973).
65. See supra notes 18 & 53 and accompanying text.
66. See PROYECTOS, supra note 13, at 26.
67. Reprinted in El Mercurio, June 26, 1973 at 1, cols. 2-3, as translated by Velasco, supra
note 24, at 726-27 (emphasis added).
68. Velasco, supra note 24, at 727.
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within two months the military coup would take place.69
III. SEPARATION OF POWERS ANALYSIS
What occurred between the executive and judicial branches of
government during the Allende rule in Chile exemplifies a prime vio-
lation of the doctrine of separation of powers.70 It serves as a harsh
lesson which evidences the extreme importance of this doctrine. It
has been stated that the "absolute independence of the Judiciary is the
Bulwark of the Constitution against encroachment by ... the execu-
tive."' 71 Furthermore, "[t]o vest in the same body executive and judi-
cial power is to remove a vital constitutional safeguard. z72 The "vital
constitutional safeguard" of an autonomous judiciary was displaced
by the Allende government in Chile.
What happened in Chile was that Allende, the executive, in ef-
fect, had swallowed up the powers of the judicial branch. This was
done through the selective enforcement and nonenforcement of judi-
cial decrees.7 3 The power and effectiveness of a constitution and its
corresponding protection of civil liberties do not emanate from its
mere existence, but rather from the recognition by the people and the
branches of government that the constitutional guidelines and limita-
tions must be followed. 74 More plainly stated, the separation of pow-
ers must be maintained to prevent the tyrannical concentration of all
the powers of government in the same hands.75
The Constitution of 1925 had been effective up until the Allende
era because this basic premise was maintained. Allende's attempt to
69. Id.
70. This doctrine states that in a three branch system of government (executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial), each branch has its independent function which should remain autonomous
and separate from the other two. The legislative branch "is empowered to make the laws, the
executive is required to carry out the laws and the judicial ... is charged with interpreting the
laws and adjudicating disputes under the laws. One branch is not permitted to encroach on
the domain of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1225 (5th ed. 1979).
71. G. MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 118 (1971) (quoting Lord Simmonds).
72. Id.; see also infra note 75 and accompanying text.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
74. James Madison recognized this when he stated "a mere demarcation on parchment of
the constitutional limits of the several departments is not a sufficient guard against those en-
croachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all powers of government in the same
hands." THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 313 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
75. Id. It has been stated that "[ain independent judiciary is a sine qua non of a Free
Society. Where judges are subservient to the executive.., power, they become instruments for
expressing the whim or caprice of those in power." W. DOUGLAS, THE ANATOMY OF LIB-
ERTY 88 (1963).
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socialize Chile was severely hindered by constitutional limitations.
Inherent in the Constitution was a system of checks and balances
which prevented any single branch of government from abrogating
the rights guaranteed to the people and guarded by the Constitution.
76
As part of this system, an independent judicial branch serves as the
foremost check on the abrogation of the rights of the individual.
77
By his inaction and selective enforcement of judgments, Allende
had violated the separation of powers which was vital to the effective-
ness of the Chilean Constitution. His unilateral imposition of ideas
and policies, in excess of his constitutional authority and in abroga-
tion of the rights of individuals, eventually destroyed Chile's constitu-
tional framework. What resulted was the breakdown of the con-
stitutional process and the loss of fundamental rights. As James
Madison stated, quoting Montesquieu, "[t]here can be no liberty
where the ... power of judging be not separated from the legislative
and executive powers .... "78 Where liberty is lost, oppression be-
gins.79 This was demonstrated by Allende's attempt to unilaterally
impose his policies on the public and the corresponding public unrest
and chaos which followed.
80
IV. JURISPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS
The doctrine of salus populi suprema lex stands for the concept
that the welfare of the people is the supreme law. 81 This maxim is the
foundation principle of civil government and has been a ruling princi-
76. The Constitution of 1925 guaranteed many rights called "Constitutional Guarantees"
to all individuals, such as the right of equality under the law, the right to freedom of worship,
freedom of movement, freedom of the press, etc. See CHILE CONST. OF 1925 art. 10, reprinted
in PROYECTOS, supra note 13, at 7.
77. Alexander Hamilton said: "This independence of the judges is equally requisite to
guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors which
the arts of designing men ... sometimes disseminate among the people .. " THE FEDERAL-
iST No. 78, at 469 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
78. Id. at 302.
79. Madison states: "Were [the power of judging] joined to the executive power, the
judge [executive], might behave with violence of an oppressor." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at
303 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
80. "Strikes, riots and street demonstrations in Santiago, Valparaiso and other important
cities virtually paralyzed the nation. Scores were injured and a few deaths were reported. On
June 21 an estimated 700,000 people took part in an anti-government demonstration near the
presidential palace." CHILE: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 8, at 247; see also D. CUSACK,
REVOLUTION AND REACTION: THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT AND CONFRONTA-
TION IN CHILE 71 (1977).
81. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1202 (5th ed. 1979).
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pie of jurisprudence for ages. 82 The law of necessity (salus populi
suprema lex) envisions the police power as the power which protects
the welfare of the community. 83 This doctrine defines the outer limits
of the police power.84 It suggests that the public welfare must necessi-
tate the exercise of the police power by the State.8 5 Furthermore,
"[t]he police power extends to all the great public needs and it may be
put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevail-
ing morality, or strong and prepondering opinion, to be greatly and
immediately necessary to the public welfare." 86
The Allende government, although initially attempting to change
Chile through the Chilean democratic process, had overstepped the
bounds of its constitutional authority.87 The expropriation and na-
tionalization of companies, factories, and land became arbitrary, ille-
gal, and unconstitutional.8 8 Requisition of companies and factories
were occurring on a daily basis.8 9 Social, political, and economic dis-
order, bordering on anarchy, were present everywhere and daily life
lacked the most elementary sense of security.90
Chaos was prevalent and a "state of necessity" had been cre-
ated. 91 The judicial branch was powerless. It had attempted to main-
tain constitutionality in Chile but was ineffective because of its lack of
power. The checks and balances on the Executive branch of govern-
ment ceased to exist. What resulted was that "[a] climate inexorably
built up that prevented any sort of institutional solution. ' 92
82. 6 RULING CASE LAW 188, § 187 (1929).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 189 (emphasis added).
87. Buckley, supra note 47, at 829, 831; see also D. CUSACK, REVOLUTION AND REAC-
TION: THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT AND CONFRONTATION IN CHILE 71 (1977).
88. See supra notes 38 & 45 and accompanying text; see also text accompanying notes 40-
41.
89. Velasco, supra note 24, at 730.
90. CHILE: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 8, at 145; see also CHILE AND ALLENDE,
supra note 30, at 128, 133, 135-36.
91. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. The situation had become so grave that
"Allende was also alienating many left-liberal moderates through his manhandling of demo-
cratic institutions in violation of his 'guarantees.'" Buckley, supra note 47, at 831. Ultimately
"a large majority of Chileans came to oppose him,fearing for the survival of their country. Peor
Es Nada. [Worse, there is nothing.]" Id. (emphasis added).
Furthermore, "[s]o bitter were relations between Dr. Allende and the legislature that he
openly called that body a 'circus' and legislative opponents, in turn, systematically impeached
key members of his many cabinets." N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1973, at 12, col. 4.
92, Id.
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Intervention by a military junta in the form of a coup d'etat was
obviously an unconstitutional alternative since it would be undemo-
cratic and unauthorized by the Congress. 93 Yet under the theory of
state necessity, "[w]hat is otherwise illegal becomes legal due to the
exigencies of the situation. ' 94 Thus, "a necessity doctrine may be ac-
ceptable at least, partially, to restore or keep the confidence of the
population in the basic institutions of government without which
chaos would arise." 95 In effect this is what happened in Chile. Al-
lende had created chaos and a state of necessity by destroying the
national institutions of democracy. 96 In fact, this was the rationale
and justification given by the military junta.
On the night of the coup, September 11, 1973, General Mandozo
of the Military Junta stated:
In this important moment of decision, the Chilean Police Force, in
forming part of the Junta that today has assumed command on the
Nation, has as its objective the re-establishment of the judicial or-
der that recently has been seriously violated .... [I]t is a question
of re-establishing the public order and returning the country to the
path of the Constitution and the law. Therefore, the spirit of the
Junta is to return to the real route of the legality.
97
In other words, the justification for the military junta and the
coup was that a state of necessity was created in Chile which man-
dated that the police force assume control of the country in order to
protect the public welfare. This justification was a prime example of
the theory of state necessity.
The doctrine of state necessity commonly comes into play where
there is avid public sentiment against the existing government.98
93. See Hassan, supra note 10.
94. Id. at 201.
95. Id. at 202.
96. It was stated by F. Reid Buckley that
On the evidence, there can be no reasonable doubt that he [Allende] was bent on
utterly revolutionizing Chile through absolute and irreversible destruction of the
economy and of all national institutions, including the congress and the supreme
court, by means of executive powers that violated the spirit of the constitution but
that could be inferred (by stretching logic) from carelessly worded legislation of the
Frei Years, and even from loopholes in the constitution itself.
Buckley, supra note 47, at 829. Other recent examples of countries other than Chile where
states of necessity were created are Nicaragua under Somoza and the Phillipines under
Marcos.
97. Reprinted in El Mercurio, Sept. 13, 1973, at 1, col. 8, as translated by Velasco, The
Allende Regime in Chile: An Historical and Legal Analysis (pt. 3), 9 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 961,
973 (1976).
98. Hassan, supra note 10, at 240.
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Under this doctrine, a military junta can only be justified because a
revolution has already taken place.99 In Chile, a revolution had oc-
curred. The Judiciary, the Congress, and the Contraloria had op-
posed the Allende regime. Public sentiment was largely anti-
Allende. 10° The last contigency to oppose the Allende government
was the military. Their opposition came in the form of a military
junta and coup d'etat which removed Allende from office on Septem-
ber 11, 1973.
V. CONCLUSION
Salvador Allende had attempted to redress the serious problems
in Chile by socializing the country. One cannot doubt his idealism or
his (constitutional) motives, for he initially attempted his "solution"
through the democratic process and with respect for all ideologies.10'
However, his "attempt" or his means, and the "solution" or the ends,
eventually became incompatible. Allende's "revolution" of Chile was
one of contradiction. He attempted to change Chile using the demo-
cratic process and then-existing laws, yet he ended up breaking down
the democratic process and traditions of Chile. It may very well be
true that a change or "revolution" to Socialism (Marxism) cannot be
completely achieved through a democratic process, but must be vio-
lent and totalitarian in order to crush its opposition and be success-
ful.10 2 This may be especially true in the Allende experiment for he
was a minority president attempting to socialize the country, and at
the same time quell mounting opposition from the communists and
the conservatives. In the end this was impossible. Any attempt at
concession alienated someone. In fact, Allende not only alienated
many factions from him, but he united them against him. The Al-
lende experience may be very important in the evolution of Marxist
thought and process, and it has special meaning for the large Marxist
parties existing today, especially those in France and Italy. 10 3
99. Id.
100. See supra notes 80 & 91 and accompanying text.
101. It was noted that "Allende and the Unidad Popular had planned 'the Chilean way to
Socialism' as a democratic pluralistic process to be achieved according to the Constitution and
with respect for all ideologies and parties." S. CHAVKIN, THE MURDER OF CHILE VIII, IX
(1982); see also infra note 103 and accompanying text.
102. Holland, Allende Out, NAT'L REV., Sept. 28, 1973, at 1038.
103. Holland states:
Allende believed he could bring about a Marxist revolution without abandoning
democratic forms and without seizing control of the entire repressive apparatus of
the state. It now looks as though the "Chilean road" is no go and orthodox commu-
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What happened in Chile under Allende shows the importance of
the role of the judiciary in a constitutional democracy, especially in
third world countries. Unlike the United States which is dominated
by a two party political system (Democrats and Republicans), most
third world countries contain multiple political parties. In order to
obtain enough votes to win a presidential election, a candidate must
align himself with other factions or form a coalition. Only in this way
is it possible to rally enough votes to win. As in Chile with Allende,
most presidents in other countries are elected by a minority of the
population - 30-40 percent of the popular vote being enough for vic-
tory since the rest of the votes are spread over the remaining parties.
What follows is that a minority president will attempt to institute his
policies on the remaining majority of the people. As president, he will
have the executive power at his disposal for this purpose. In order to
prevent arbitrariness and abuses of the constitutional rights of the in-
dividual in a democracy, an independent and autonomous judiciary is
required. If an independent and autonomous judiciary does not exist,
the executive will go unchecked and the possibility of repression will
be great.
One lesson to be learned from the Allende experiment in Chile is
the true weakness of the judiciary in a constitutional democracy. An-
other lesson to be learned is that the power of the people of a nation
and of public opinion is extremely strong. Allende lost the support of
the middle class which then turned against him, and that factor con-
tributed substantially to his downfall. For a revolution of any form to
be successful, the support of the people is necessary, and Allende,
through many of his actions, lost the support of the people of Chile.
What has been presented are certain historical facts, which, cou-
pled with a jurisprudential analysis, tend to illuminate and explain the
violent coup d'etat which ousted Salvador Allende from power in
Chile. It is by no means a rationalization or justification for the atroc-
ities and violence which followed and continue today in Chile. 104 It is
well known that "[o]nce the principle of necessity is accepted, oppor-
tunities for abuse inevitably arise."10 5 Necessity, once it is accepted,
can be used as an excuse for all actions. Furthemore, power can be a
nist expectation correct: a genuine Marxist revolution must be violent and totalitar-
ian in order to crush the inevitable opposition to it.
Id. at 1040.
104. See COVERT ACTION IN CHILE, supra note 3, at 62; S. CHAVKIN, supra note 8;
CHILE: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 8.
105. Hassan, supra note 10, at 202.
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tremendously dangerous and almost addicting instrument leading to
many kinds of abuses.
Chile remains under the rule of the military. "Meanwhile, the
constitutional tradition of Chile has been irremediably riven: The 160
years of almost continuous democratic tradition simply cannot be re-
vived after the abuses of Allende, the Counter-revolution, and what
may be the long tenure of the current regime."' 0 6 It was not until
quite recently that the military junta restored legal status to political
parties in Chile after a thirteen year suspension - that is, of course,
with the exception of Marxist political parties. 0
7
Neal P. Panish
106. Buckley, supra note 47, at 847; see also Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. 1
(uncertainty and fear cloud the political future of Chile).
107. L.A. Times, Jan. 16, 1987, § 1, at 12, col. 1.

